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Note 
Bleeding Out: The Case for Strengthening 
Healthcare Client Portal Data Privacy 
Regulations 
Matthew D. McCord* 
On a cool, May Friday in Long Beach, California, one of the 
largest managed healthcare companies in the United States 
abruptly yanked its patient portal system out of production.1 
Molina Healthcare (“Molina”) pulled its key customer-facing 
system because of a dangerous set of application security faults 
lurking in the code after a security researcher reported an 
anonymous tip.2 The application reportedly failed to 
authenticate patients against their claims and passed claim IDs 
through plain, user-modifiable URL text, allowing any user to 
view any other claim just by changing the URL.3 The data 
compromised included individualized, valuable, and closely-
guarded protected health information (PHI), including patient 
names, addresses, dates of birth, diagnoses, and prescriptions 
among other data points and descriptors, opening patients to 
damaging leaks of their private health and to medical fraud.4 
                                                        
© 2019 Matthew D. McCord 
* JD Candidate 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. 
 1. Jessica Davis, Molina Healthcare Breached, Exposed Patient Data for 
Over a Month, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (May 30, 2017), http://www.healthcareit-
news.com/news/molina-healthcare-breached-exposed-patient-data-over-month 
(describing the security breach that occurred at Molina Healthcare, a company 
that provides health care services to low-income families and individuals). For 
information on Molina’s size and headquarters location, see Molina Healthcare, 
FORTUNE 500, http://fortune.com/fortune500/molina-healthcare/ (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2017). For information on local weather on the date of the incident re-
sponse, see Weather History for Long Beach, CA, WEATHER UNDERGROUND, 
https://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KLGB/2017/5/26/DailyHis-
tory.html?req_city=&req_state=&req_stat-
ename=&reqdb.zip=&reqdb.magic=&reqdb.wmo= (last visited Dec. 3, 2017). 
 2. Davis, supra note 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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Yet, the data contained in insurer portals can pale in comparison 
to the extensive data held by and across particular healthcare 
providers (e.g. one’s primary doctor or cardiologist).5 While 
insurer data may include generalized data about claims, 
provider portals can contain compendiums of full lab results, 
summaries of care, patient concerns, practitioner impressions, 
personal and relatives’ contact information, and billing data.6 
While Molina quickly stated that it was in the “process of 
conducting an internal investigation to determine the impact” of 
the breach, and that “protecting [its] members’ information is of 
utmost importance[,]” the researcher behind the revelation, 
Brian Krebs, remained unnerved.7 Mr. Krebs stated that it was 
“unconscionable that such a basic, Security 101 flaw could still 
exist at a major healthcare provider today,” yet notes that these 
“serious vulnerabilities” are far from disparate events, but are 
rather common and pressing problems in the United States’ 
national health and cybersecurity infrastructure.8 
                                                        
 5. See What is a Patient Portal?, HEALTHIT.GOV, 
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/faqs/what-patient-portal (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2017) (finding that the most comprehensive portals have 
virtualized office visits, secure provider-to-patient messaging, benefits and 
coverage information, financial and billing information, relatives’ medical 
summaries, and comprehensive medical histories stored on or, at a minimum, 
processed through their servers); see, e.g., Blue Cross Online Visits, BLUE CROSS 
BLUE SHIELD OF MICH., https://www.bcbsm.com/index/find-a-doctor/online-
visits.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). 
 6. See What is a Patient Portal?, supra note 5 (concluding that billing data 
includes financially sensitive data like credit card numbers, insurance group 
and member numbers, prescription billing information, bank account numbers, 
and other information used to pay and validate payment between patients, 
providers, and payers). 
 7. Davis, supra note 1. 
 8. See id. The flaw itself was exposure of a “GET” request, reflecting this 
“basic, Security 101” error that was “unconscionable” in its existence. This 
reflection, by industry standards, sounds largely in truth and common sense. 
See, e.g., Kevin Beaver, Why Use POST vs. GET to Keep Applications Secure, 
TECHTARGET (Feb. 2010), 
http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/tip/Why-use-POST-vs-GET-to-
keep-applications-secure (finding that businesses should avoid using GET 
requests at all costs); Paris Mitton, Never Put Secrets in URLs and Query 
Parameters, FULLCONTACT (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.fullcontact.com/blog/never-put-secrets-urls-query-parameters/ 
(finding that URLs and query parameters aren’t secure). Indeed, the data-
passing flaw and subsequent failure-to-authenticate flaw are both listed in the 
Open Web Application Security Project’s database as common vulnerabilities, 
with the authentication failure cited as one of the ten most critical application 
security risks. OPEN WEB APPLICATION SEC. PROJECT, OWASP TOP 10 – 2017: 
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Cybersecurity has loudly slammed the world of healthcare 
in recent years, with the severity and frequency of attacks on the 
national healthcare infrastructure attracting the noticeable 
scrutiny of the federal government.9 Healthcare has become a 
substantially attractive cyberattack vector with the advent of 
the Internet of Things and its spread into life-critical systems 
like insulin pumps, increased device interconnectedness, rapidly 
spreading digitization, and increasing public demand for and 
activation of open access vectors for patients to view their 
information.10 
                                                        
The Ten Most Critical Web Application Security Risk , 12 (2017), 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10-2017_Top_10 (denoting as a critical 
application vulnerability the uncontrolled, i.e. unchecked, access to sensitive 
web application data layers and systems through improper validation and 
control of POST requests, the alternative, more secure, web application request 
type to GET, as occurred in this particular case); Data Validation, OPEN WEB 
SEC. APPLICATION PROJECT, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Data_Validation 
(last modified Dec. 1, 2013) (“strongly discourag[ing] . . . GET request” protocols 
for sending data except for navigational purposes). Yet, these vulnerabilities 
are seen, despite clear industry standards being set, repeatedly in notes on 
vulnerabilities in all manner of applications. See, e.g., CVE-2017-6086, NAT’L 
VULNERABILITY DATABASE, https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-
bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-6086 (last visited Mar. 8, 2018); NVD - CVE-
2017-12212, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., 
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12212 (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). 
 9. HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE, REPORT ON 
IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 5 (June 2017) 
(discussing and developing recommendations on the growing challenge of cyber 
attacks targeting health care). 
 10. Id. at 10. For a discussion of the extensive cybersecurity concerns with 
medical devices, see generally John G. Browning & Shawn Tuma, If Your Heart 
Skips a Beat, It May Have Been Hacked: Cybersecurity Concerns with Implanted 
Medical Devices, 67 S.C. L. REV. 637 (2016) (finding that there is panic over 
hackable pacemakers, for example, which reflects cybersecurity concerns 
grounded in realism, with unconscionable consequences of failures and 
shortcomings). As patient portals often store medical records of patients, 
including their prescription records, care summaries, and present conditions, 
data on which medical professionals rely in making treatment decisions, a 
carefully-constructed attack on a patient record system could foreseeably lead 
to similarly austere harms as those posited by RFID pacemakers and similar 
medical devices. See What is a Patient Portal?, supra note 5 (describing the 
kinds of records that can be processed and contained on patient portals); Shahid 
Mansuri, How Patient Portals are Improving the Virtual Healthcare System, 
VALIDIC (Jan. 4, 2018), https://validic.com/how-patient-portals-are-improving-
the-virtual-healthcare-system/ (discussing and analyzing how the adoption of 
patient portals have integrated this particular bit of technology with the active 
medical practices and decisions of a broad swathe of medical professionals, 
especially in on-demand care, as the march toward medical efficiency 
continues); Patient Portal Benefits Patient Care and Provider Workflow, 
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This Note seeks to examine the field of cybersecurity as it 
intersects with healthcare through an examination of the 
security of provider and insurer portals and the data contained 
on them, describe the security concerns flowing out of health 
information digitization, and provide for remediation of these 
concerns in an increasingly digital and increasingly digitally-
besieged world. Part I will cover relevant background 
information on patient portals generally, the scope and value of 
health records stored on these portals, the rapidly-increasing 
vectors for digital attacks on national healthcare infrastructure, 
the evolution of distributed application security generally, the 
statutory schemes for regulating health portal data, and 
findings of liability for health data breaches. Part II will explore 
the ways in which proper healthcare portal data security 
furthers the national interest and the adequacy of the current 
and proposed statutory scheme’s coverage of portal data. Part III 
will describe ways to create proper healthcare data security 
across the industry through a proposed legislative framework to 
address the continually-evolving challenges of healthcare IT. 
The Note will then conclude by stating that the hazards of 
insecurity discussed threaten national security, and the 
technology surrounding health data portals should reflect that 
risk through a comprehensive and enforceable but flexible 
statutory framework designed to supersede the present 
piecemeal approach to data security in the sector. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This background section will introduce the relevant 
historical background and recent developments pertaining to 
patient healthcare portals, including insurance claim and 
customer databases and provider servicing applications. This 
part will include a discussion of breaches at health providers and 
health insurers inclusive of physical plant breaches. This part 
will also discuss the vast increase in vectors for obtaining 
healthcare information and thus vectors for attack, with 
particular focus on web portals and the rise of state actors and 
                                                        
HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/case-study/patient-portal-benefits-
patient-care-and-provider-workflow (last reviewed Sept. 19, 2017) (describing a 
government industry information release using the case study of a Primary 
Health Medical Group in Idaho to relay a similar message as Mr. Mansuri in 
relation to the benefits and contingent reliance of medical professionals on 
patient portals). 
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powerful, well-resourced groups hijacking information in recent 
years. This discussion ends by introducing the hodgepodge 
regulatory and statutory framework for healthcare data 
protection and the bases for liability to which healthcare 
businesses may expose themselves due to inadequate data 
protection policies. 
A. HISTORY OF PATIENT PORTALS 
A patient portal, per the U.S. government, is “a secure 
online website that gives patients convenient[,] 24-hour access 
to personal health information from anywhere[.]”11 Online 
medical portals entered rapid adoption in 2011 as part of the 
Meaningful Use technology investment program incorporated in 
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health (HITECH) Act of 2009.12 The HITECH Act allocated 
$19.2 billion to fund health information technology development, 
with expenditures guided by the Meaningful Use program 
requirements.13 
Specifically, the Meaningful Use requirements provided a 
carrot-and-stick approach to enforcing adoption among Medicare 
and Medicaid servicing providers.14 With HITECH foreseeing a 
problem of then-low health information technology provider 
adoption rates due to the high implementation costs of these 
                                                        
 11. See What is a Patient Portal?, supra note 5. As briefly discussed in that 
note and accompanying sources, health portals can range from a “barebones” 
summary of care received or appointment scheduling interface to a one-stop, 
unified records, access, care, and financial system spanning entire 
amalgamated care and hospital networks as these systems deign to provide 
maximal efficiency and unified user experience/single location benefits for 
providers, patients, and payers; see also Mansuri, supra note 10 (explaining the 
developments made in patient portal technology). 
 12. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
5, § 3001, 123 Stat. 115, 231 (Feb. 17, 2009) (containing HITECH after 
consolidation of the bills in question); Terese Otte-Trojel et al., Characteristics 
of Patient Portals Developed in the Context of Health Information Exchanges: 
Early Policy Effects of Incentives in the Meaningful Use Program in the United 
States, J. MED. INTERNET RES., Nov. 21, 2014, at e258-1, 2 (finding that 
HITECH included USD 30 billion for accelerating and mainstreaming the use 
of health information technology). 
 13. CHRISTINE PETERSON, HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGES AND 
PATIENT PORTALS IN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 7 (2015). 
 14. See Nicolas P. Terry, Certification and Meaningful Use: Reframing 
Adoption of Electronic Health Records as a Quality Imperative, 8 IND. HEALTH 
L. REV. 43, 50 (2011) (finding that Medicaid and Medicare incentive payments 
will be made to doctors). 
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systems, the Act provided subsidies for implementation of 
substantial electronic health record (EHR) systems, which 
include the functionality offered by patient portals as integrated 
EHR systems.15 The incentive program ran its five-year course 
in 2016, and the incentives became penalties to participating 
providers, with hospitals failing to use EHR systems for 
“meaningful purposes” docked one to five percent per year of 
their Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement payments.16 
This spring of grant finances, the threat of Medicare 
penalties, and the business logic in moving toward online 
storage of patient information rapidly shifted many providers 
away from paper-centric information management and toward 
digital record solutions.17 Adopting patient portals can provide 
for the more efficient practice of medicine and can enhance the 
quality of care patients receive, enabling remote interactions to 
better use physician and patient time if adopted properly.18 In 
                                                        
 15. See 42 C.F.R. § 495.102(b) (Oct. 1, 2017) (containing detailed provisions 
regarding incentive amounts); see also Terry, supra note 14 (finding that a 
physician participating in the full five-year incentive program “could receive the 
maximum subsidy of $44,000 through Medicare” if not employed through their 
hospital; hospital systems are eligible for a $2 million baseline, with additional 
monies disbursed based on a formula regarding inpatient discharges). 
 16. See 42 C.F.R. § 495.102(d) (Oct. 1, 2017); Terry, supra note 14 
(discussing that starting in 2016, HITECH’s “carrots” will be replaced by 
“sticks”); AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, Meaningful Use Adjustments, 2 HEALTH 
L. PRAC. GUIDE § 25:37 (2017) (“Beginning in 2015, CMS will negatively adjust 
the reimbursement of physicians and certain other eligible professionals who 
do not meet the ‘meaningful use’ criteria related to their use of EHRs.”). 
 17. See Kristine Crane, How Patient Portals are Changing Health Care, 
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (June 30, 2014), 
https://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2014/06/30/how-
patient-portals-are-changing-health-care (discussing the general shift of 
medicine to online service delivery and its consumer use case, namely doing 
away with physically-encumbering paper files and providing for speed and ease 
of communication between patient-consumer and physician, as well as single-
practice numbers in a portal-implementing provider setting indicating an 
adoption rate of roughly three-quarters). Patient portals have been heavily 
advocated in the business context of healthcare service delivery due to consumer 
demand and efficiency pressures. See, e.g., Heather Landi, The Business Case 
for Increasing Patient Portal Adoption, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Jan. 7, 
2016), https://www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/business-case-
increasing-patient-portal-adoption; Elizabeth W. Woodcock, How Patient 
Portals Create Value for Patients—and Fulfill Meaningful Use Requirements, 
http://www.medfusion.net/docs/Patient%20Portals%20MU%20white%20paper.
pdf. (retrieved Dec. 1, 2017). 
 18. See generally Daniel F. Shay, A Window Into Patient Portals: Legal and 
Practical Issues for Physician Practices, 2017 HEALTH L. HANDBOOK 13 (May 
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the long term, efficiencies brought about through digital 
innovation can lower costs for patients and insurers, decreasing 
the financial burden of administrative overhead on the 
healthcare delivery system.19 
Patient portal adoption also gathered steam as part of the 
wider consumer information access movement.20 The increasing 
rate of digitization has increased the power of the consumer and 
the competition for consumers’ time and money.21 Consumers, 
generally, have come to desire easy, on-demand access to their 
care records.22 Similarly, consumers wish to have transparent 
access to their health plan’s claims information.23 As a result, 
insurers, like providers, have implemented patient portals with 
virtual unanimity to provide consumer access to the information 
they demand.24 
B. SCOPE AND VALUE OF HEALTH RECORDS 
Health records are an intrinsically ubiquitous and valuable 
set of data, leaving their owners vulnerable to multiple frauds, 
thefts, and other unpleasantries if left exposed.25 Health records 
                                                        
2017) (discussing the advantages of using mobile phones and applications to 
access patient care). 
 19. See id.; see also Mansuri, supra note 10 and accompanying text 
(discussing the combination of public and private economic efficiency, demand-
based, and grant incentives resulting in shifting the market balance heavily 
toward the adoption of full-service patient portal suites); Otte-Trojel, supra note 
12, at 2 (noting that The Meaningful Use requirement “stick” all but ensured 
near-total adoption of patient portals in satisfaction of the EHR requirements); 
What Physicians Need to Know About Patient Portals, AMA WIRE (July 7, 2015), 
https://wire.ama-assn.org/practice-management/what-physicians-need-know-
about-patient-portals (“Patients are used to accessing information online 
immediately, from checking their bank balance to booking travel. Physicians 
can tap into this expectation using patient portals.”). 
 20. See generally William B. Lober & Janine L. Flowers, Consumer 
Empowerment in Health Care Amid the Internet and Social Media, 27 
SEMINARS IN ONCOLOGY NURSING 169, 174 (2011) (discussing how social trends 
are visible in the integration of information and communication technologies 
into health care, in both searching for and sharing information on the internet). 
 21. See id. at 170. 
 22. See id. at 176. 
 23. See Rick Krohn, The Consumer-Centric Personal Health Record—It’s 
Time, J. HEALTHCARE INFO. MGMT., Feb. 2007, at 20–21 (finding that “[w]hile 
surveys confirm that most of the general population is unaware of PHR systems, 
they also reveal consumer and patient interest in their potential value”). 
 24. Id. at 21. 
 25. See Caroline Hunter & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record Is Worth More 
to Hackers Than Your Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014), 
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have long been recognized as vulnerable, valuable targets worth 
ten to twenty times that of a stolen credit card number.26 Data 
stolen from health records includes personally identifiable 
information (PII) and PHI, with names, diagnoses, payer IDs, 
financial information, summaries of care, contact information, 
and dates of birth potentially compromised in a breach of such a 
record.27 
This valuable data is most commonly used in insurance 
fraud because of its difficult-to-audit nature compared to other 
financial frauds.28 A thief can abscond with one’s insurance 
name, date of birth, enrollee number, and group number, and, in 
theory, run huge bills against their victims—the insurer and the 
enrollee, purchasing and reselling, or using themselves, medical 
equipment and drugs.29 Such an actor can also falsify provider 
numbers and file bogus claims against the insurer.30 This sort of 
fraud has increased exponentially as technology has developed, 
though most anti-fraud efforts on the part of government and 
insurers remain focused on fraudulent provider billing 
practices.31 Often, the first sign of this fraud to a patient is not a 
strange line item from the credit card company or a call from a 
biller, but a months-out call from a medical collections agent, 
unordered service line items in the oft-discarded and unread 
payer Explanation of Benefits notices, or some other form of 
notice from the health insurer.32 Cases of medical identity theft 
cost the average victim around $13,500 to fix, with an estimated 
2.32 million victims.33 The total cost to the economy for medical 
                                                        
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-hospitals/your-medical-
record-is-worth-more-to-hackers-than-your-credit-card-
idUSKCN0HJ21I20140924 (“Security experts say cyber criminals are 
increasingly targeting the $3 trillion U.S. healthcare industry.”). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT (Aug. 2012), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0171-medical-identity-theft (discussing 
ways to report and recover from medical identity theft). 
 29. Hunter & Finkle, supra note 26. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28. 
 33. See Dan Munro, New Study Says Over 2 Million Americans Are Victims 
of Medical Identity Theft, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/02/23/new-study-says-over-2-
million-americans-are-victims-of-medical-identity-theft/#470344ee15a0; see 
also Kelli B. Grant, How to Protect Yourself From Medical Identity Theft, CNBC 
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identity theft was estimated at $41.3 billion in 2012, or around 
1.5% of 2010 total medical spending in the United States.34 
Health data can be and is used for more classic forms of 
identity theft, due to the trove of information a patient record 
can represent.35 The health sector had a plurality, in comparison 
to all other major sectors of domestic economic activity, of total 
incidents of identity theft reported in one report.36 The data 
stolen from healthcare providers did not solely include patient 
PHI: other lost data includes PII, financial, payment, and 
authentication data.37 Leaked PII and payment information are 
used to run fraudulent charges against the victim’s credit cards, 
open new lines of credit in the victim’s name, file false tax 
returns, assume the victim’s credentials to gain access, sell the 
victim’s data to others who can engage in frauds, and undertake 
other activities in the victim’s name.38 If the PII or PHI leaked 
includes the victim’s relative’s name or other personal 
information, data criminals can use that data to force their way 
into the victim’s accounts through deriving answers to security 
questions, such as his mother’s maiden name, his first child’s 
name, last four digits of his social security number, or other 
identity verification queries that can be derived in such a 
fashion.39 
                                                        
(Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/08/how-to-protect-yourself-
from-medical-identity-theft.html. 
 34. See Michelle Andrews, The Rise of Medical Identity Theft, CONSUMER 
REPORTS (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.consumerreports.org/medical-identity-
theft/medical-identity-theft/; see also Health Care Costs: A Primer, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUNDATION (May 1, 2012), https://www.kff.org/report-section/health-
care-costs-a-primer-2012-report/ (discussing U.S. healthcare spending as a 
portion of the economy generally). 
 35. See NUMAAN HUQ, FOLLOW THE DATA: DISSECTING DATA BREACHES 
AND DEBUNKING MYTHS 13 (2015), https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-
content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-follow-the-data.pdf 
(finding that hackers use health data to “gain access to resources or services, 
apply for credit cards or loans, register fake accounts, file fraudulent tax returns 
to collect rebates, and other activities without the victim’s knowledge or 
consent.”). 
 36. See id. (finding that the healthcare sector was most affected by data 
breaches, followed by the government and retail sectors). 
 37. See id. at 14. 
 38. Id. at 13, 22. 
 39. For a discussion of the possibilities of derivative identity theft like the 
hypothetical posed in the accompanying text, see Mike Timmermann, Why You 
Should Change All of Your Security Question Answers Right Now, CLARK (Oct. 
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Health record loss threatens the integrity of one’s person at 
the most extreme end of data-enabled personal information 
disclosure.40 Breach of protected health records poses a threat to 
one’s person in two primary ways: first, the classical safety risks 
of release of PII; second, release or compromise of a patient’s 
PHI, and the consequences such exposure brings. The first 
threat resembles the classic dangers of PII release, or “doxxing,” 
in online parlance.41 Releasing a person’s name and home or job 
address renders them targets for cyberbullying, stalking, and 
extortion.42 One of the more extreme examples of threats to the 
person extending from PII release is “swatting,” a form of 
extreme harassment where a false emergency is reported at the 
victim’s home or office and an often fully-armed police response 
follows.43 Victims may then be surprised at gunpoint, as in the 
case of California state senator Ted Lieu in 2013.44 This 
harassment may result in the injury or death of the victim.45 
Release of PII obtained from health portals carries as much risk 
                                                        
6, 2017), http://clark.com/consumer-issues-id-theft/security-questions-
challenge-answers-hackers-why-you-should-change/. 
 40. See Huq, supra note 36, at 13 (showing healthcare industry to have the 
most breaches of any industry); Hunter & Finkle, supra note 26 (discussing 
value of health information). See supra sections I.A and I.B for a discussion of 
the large amount and variety of personal and identifiable information stored 
with medical providers through EHR and patient portal systems. 
 41. See Anneliese Mahoney, Doxxing and Swatting: New Frontiers in 
Online Harassment, LAW STREET (May 8, 2017), 
https://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/technology/doxxing-swatting-online-
harassment/ (explaining that “doxxing,” from the word “document,” is the 
release of personal information). 
 42. See id.; see also Ana Dascalescu, Doxxing Can Ruin Your Life. Here’s 
How (You Can Avoid It), HEIMDAL SECURITY (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://heimdalsecurity.com/blog/doxxing/#doxxingnudes (noting various 
instances of doxxing). 
 43. See Mahoney, supra note 41. 
 44. See id.; Patrick McGreevy, Senator with Anti-Swatting Bill is Victim of 
Hoax Emergency Call, L.A.TIMES (Apr. 19, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/19/local/la-me-pc-senator-swatting-
20130419 (recounting how a hoax text message prompted an armed police 
response to a purported shooting at the Senator’s home). 
 45. For example, after a false report of a hostage situation, armed police 
shot a victim of swatting with rubber bullets, resulting in broken bones and 
bruising. See Ben Kentish, British Man Charged After US Gamer is Shot by 
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of crimes against the person as release of PII from any other 
source.46 
The second threat against the person that results from a 
release or compromise of health records specifically involves 
sensitive PHI. PHI can be used as a mode of blackmail and 
extortion.47 Medical records include sensitive information, like 
diagnoses of psychological conditions, sexually transmitted 
diseases, cancer, and other compromising information.48 Release 
of this information can at the least cause embarrassment, and 
at the worst feed character assassination of more public 
persons.49 If a patient portal system were sufficiently 
compromised and an actor had particularly bad intent, these 
systems could be used to directly harm a person in the medical 
context as well.50 For example, a bad actor with access to a 
targeted patient’s medical condition, prescription, and care 
records could edit those records to reflect the information they 
wanted to see. Physicians rely on the accuracy of their electronic 
health records of their patients to prescribe medication and 
undertake courses of treatment.51 A bad actor could, in theory, 
edit that record, misleading a physician to undertake a course of 
treatment that could seriously harm a patient because of the 
compromised data’s inaccuracy.52 
                                                        
 46. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 3536 at 13; Personally Identifiable 
Information: HIPAA Best Practices, VIRTRU (May 20, 2016), 
https://www.virtru.com/blog/personally-identifiable-information-hipaa/. 
 47. Mariya Yao, Your Electronic Medical Records Could Be Worth $1000 To 
Hackers, FORBES (Apr. 14, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mariyayao/2017/04/14/your-electronic-medical-
records-can-be-worth-1000-to-hackers/#584686e350cf. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. Yao discusses use of falsified PHI to suggest Hillary Clinton was not 
physically able to hold office, thus potentially undermining her presidential bid 
in 2016. Id.; see also Robert Farley, Fake Clinton Medical Records, 
FACTCHECK.ORG (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.factcheck.org/2016/08/fake-
clinton-medical-records/. 
 50. Clarke & Youngstein, Cyberattack on Britain’s National Health Service 
— A Wake-Up Call for Modern Medicine, NEW ENG. J. OF MED., Aug. 3, 2017, at 
411. 
 51. See discussion supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 52. This is far from the realm of speculative science fiction. See the 
discussion of medical device hackability concerns and the transferability of 
those harms in principle to patient portals, which play a similarly crucial role 
in patient care, supra note 10. 
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C. PRIMER ON DISTRIBUTED APPLICATION SECURITY METHODS 
Distributed application security measures form a 
constantly-evolving component of information security.53 A 
variety of methods exist to strengthen applications in the face of 
attack, many of which are balanced on a cost-benefit analysis of 
their implementation in specific applications, as well as on the 
competency of a particular development team.54 In the present 
technological environment, the most notable and widely-
implemented method of securing application communications is 
in-transit encryption, commonly over the Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) protocol.55 SSL is a silent-running method of application 
security which encrypts communications when they are in 
transit between a client’s computer and a provider’s server, 
effectively preventing data eavesdroppers from unscrambling 
that data and leeching off the unguarded information—which 
may include PHI and PII.56 Without SSL encryption, an attacker 
could listen in on communications between the provider’s server 
and the patient’s machine, enabling her to siphon off all kinds of 
personal data.57 SSL is one of the few specific federal 
cybersecurity regulatory requirements presently in effect.58 For 
example, the U.S. Department of Defense is required to use SSL 
to store protected information.59 
Another primary form of data security is the encryption of 
data on the server itself through hardware and software. This 
                                                        
 53. See generally J.M. Olejarz, The Evolving Cyberthreat, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Nov. 2015, at 150, 151 (arguing that a more dynamic security strategy sharing 
platform is necessary to keep up with equally dynamic cyberthreats). 
 54. See generally Mohammad S. Jalali & Jessica P. Kaiser, Cybersecurity 
in Hospitals: A Systematic, Organizational Perspective, J. MED. INTERNET RES., 
May 8, 2018, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5996174/ 
(discussing how hospitals decide what cybersecurity measures to pursue). 
 55. See id.; see also Everything You Need to Know About SSL Certificates, 
VERISIGN, https://www.verisign.com/en_US/website-presence/website-
optimization/ssl-certificates/index.xhtml (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). SSL 
presence is often indicated by a “lock” indicator in many internet browsers. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. (describing SSL as enabling a “private conversation just between 
the two intended parties”). 
 58. See KATE CHARLET, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS, UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY 6 (2018) (noting that 
federal agencies are required to develop and report generally on cybersecurity 
measures). There is no mention of specific programs or technologies required by 
the federal government; see also id. 
 59. 32 C.F.R. § 505.2(c)(3) (2019). 
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type of encryption scrambles the data so that someone with 
access to the provider’s server cannot arbitrarily gain access to 
the data stored on it.60 For web applications, decryption (for data 
presented to the user) and encryption (for data submitted by the 
user or provider to or through the application) may be handled 
on the “front end” (i.e., decrypted or encrypted on the user’s 
machine) or the “back end” (where operations are handled on the 
server and the results presented through an encrypted SSL 
pipe).61 
Additional measures exist for securing web-based 
applications that are of particular relevance to PHI-sensitive 
uses.62 Multi-factor authentication requires the end user to use 
another method, other than their username and password, to log 
in to a computer or site.63 User role authentication and control 
prevents users from accessing data that is not theirs, editing 
data which they should not be editing, or gaining privileges they 
should not have.64 This kind of authentication could have 
prevented the sort of breach Molina experienced.65 Another 
method—enforcing updates to system and application software, 
or “patching”—is often deployed to close known security 
vulnerabilities,66 a commonly-touted best practice that the 
                                                        
 60. See Caroline Sanders Reach, Client Data in the Cloud, 28 CHI. B. ASS’N 
REC. 44, 49 (2014). 
 61. See generally Eric Limer, Mega’s Clever Encryption Will Protect You, 
But Mostly Kim Dotcom, GIZMODO (Jan. 19, 2013), 
https://gizmodo.com/5977265/how-megas-encryption-will-protect-you-but-
mostly-kim-dotcom. 
 62. See generally ORACLE, HITECH’S CHALLENGE TO THE HEALTH CARE 
INDUSTRY (2011), https://www.oracle.com/assets/owp-security-hipaa-hitech-
522515.pdf. 
 63. See Info. Tech. Lab., Back to Basics: Multi-Factor Authentication 
(MFA), NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH. (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://www.nist.gov/itl/tig/back-basics-multi-factor-authentication. This sort 
of authentication most commonly includes a mobile phone app response or entry 
of a code sent via text message, but can include facial recognition, smartcards, 
biometrics, and other forms of authentication. See id. An attacker thus would 
not be able to access someone’s portal account merely with their password but 
would have the added challenge of taking whatever device acts as the second 
authenticator, or cracking a second-factor biometric. See id. 
 64. See Azure Data Security and Encryption Best Practices, MICROSOFT 
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/azure-security-
data-encryption-best-practices. 
 65. See generally id.; see also Davis, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Dan Goldberg & Addy Baird, As Cyber Attacks Rise, Hospitals Seek 
to Protect Medical Records, POLITICO (Apr. 14, 2016), 
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healthcare industry in particular rarely follows.67 Training users 
on system use and compliance, in addition to in-built data 
validation, can prevent potentially catastrophic user errors.68 
Out-of-date software, which many hospitals and clinics may 
use,69 contains vulnerabilities which are often patched on newer 
releases; these (undefended because of legacy software) 
vulnerabilities are known to attackers, who can make an easy 
grab for information.70 Thus, the medical sector is an easier 
target for information criminals.71 Ensuring that software is 
regularly updated would go far in protecting hospitals and 
clinics from these simple attacks.72 
D. EVOLUTION OF DATA SECURITY AND HEALTHCARE DATA 
STATUTES 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA)73 forms the cornerstone of the current healthcare 
                                                        
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2016/04/as-cyber-
attacks-rise-hospitals-seek-to-protect-medical-records-067223. 
 67. See Mike Schrock, Unpatched Software Vulnerabilities a Growing 
Problem, OPSWAT (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.opswat.com/blog/unpatched-
software-vulnerabilities-growing-problem (noting that 44% of breaches in 2014 
exploited vulnerabilities that could have been patched via software updates two 
to four years prior); Steve Manzuik, How Hospitals Are Getting Hacked and 
How to Prevent It From Happening To You, HEALTH IT OUTCOMES (May 26, 
2016), https://www.healthitoutcomes.com/doc/how-hospitals-are-getting-
hacked-and-how-to-prevent-it-from-happening-to-you-0001 (listing outdated 
software and hardware as the major vulnerabilities in hospital cybersecurity). 
 68. See generally Goldberg & Baird, supra note 66. 
 69. Software often goes unpatched or underpatched in medical contexts due 
to a combination of lack of financial resources, dependence on software only 
compatible with older versions of system software or other interdependent 
programs, or a perceived lack of need to upgrade by key stakeholders. See, e.g., 
Manzuik, supra note 67; Damien Gayle et al., NHS Seeks to Recover from Global 
Cyber-Attack as Security Concerns Resurface, THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/may/12/hospitals-across-england-
hit-by-large-scale-cyber-attack; Noel Towell & Aisha Dow, Obsolete, Outdated 
Software puts Victorian Hospitals and Police at Risk of Cyber Attacks, THE AGE 
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/obsolete-
outdated-software-puts-victorian-hospitals-and-police-at-risk-of-cyber-attacks-
20171129-gzv9ov.html. 
 70. See Manzuik, supra note 67. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 
29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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data regulatory scheme.74 HIPAA effectively acts as the health 
sector catch-all statute, authorizing the promulgation of health 
sector regulations for covered entities (i.e. insurers, billing 
clearinghouses, and providers).75 HIPAA requires that the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) and the 
Attorney General issue guidelines to coordinate the 
enforcement, investigation, and evaluation of health plans to 
control fraud and abuse.76 In so doing, it protects the individual’s 
privacy and information confidentiality throughout the course of 
investigation.77 HIPAA’s information regulating muscle derives 
from the Administrative Simplification part of the Act, which 
sets out broad definitions of health information and requires the 
Secretary to promulgate regulations and standards to safeguard 
the security of health information and transactions.78 The Act 
also provides for regulatory and criminal penalties for 
noncompliance or knowing wrongful disclosure of “individually 
identifiable health information[,]” while refusing to preempt 
other causes of action that may arise out of such 
misappropriation or noncompliance.79 
The previously discussed HITECH Act, enacted as part of 
the wider American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, 
established an Office of the National Coordinator for health 
information technology and created a grant program to advance 
                                                        
 74. See Aaron P. Sohaski & Jordan B. Segal, Litigation in a HITECH 
World, 95 MICH. B.J. 52, 52 (Nov. 2016); see generally Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie 
P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health 
Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 683–84 (2007). 
 75. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 
104–191, § 1172, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); see also Juliana Bell, Comment, Privacy 
at Risk: Patients Use New Web Products to Store and Share Personal Health 
Records, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 485, 488 (2009) (citing Deborah F. Buckman, 
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and Regulations 
Promulgated Thereunder, 194 A.L.R. Fed. 133 (2004). In essence, anyone in the 
direct chain of data processing or use between patient and provider, though not 
necessarily third parties outside that chain like fitness data amalgamators or 
user-initiated application portals outside the provider-patient scheme, is 
covered and must ensure the safety of patient data inside and outside the 
facility. See Sohaski & Segal, supra note 74. 
 76. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 
104–191, § 1128C(a)(3)(B), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1320a–
7c). 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. §§ 1172, 1173, 1175 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1–d-4). 
 79. Id. §§ 1176, 1177 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5–6). 
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“health care information enterprise integration[.]”80 HITECH 
also established the aforementioned carrot-and-stick incentives 
to shift providers to EHRs,81 created a policy committee 
empowered to recommend national health infrastructure 
developments,82 and created regional centers of excellence to 
disseminate best practices to health organizations.83 
HITECH’s substantive amendments to HIPAA came 
through its Part D privacy modifications. HITECH requires 
covered entities to implement policies and procedures to 
“prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations[,]” 
perform risk assessments, and implement sanction, risk 
analysis, review, and disaster recovery policies.84 Further 
requirements include the implementation of facility security 
plans, sensitive information disposal plans, and access control 
and authentication measures.85 
HITECH further requires that a company subject to a data 
breach notify the users impacted of the scope of the breach 
within sixty days, with breaches involving more than 500 
records to be reported to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (which the Department may then disclose as an 
incident) unless law enforcement deems notification to be a 
threat to national security or criminal investigations.86 
                                                        
 80. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
5, Title 8, 123 Stat. 115, 179 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 19, 26, 29, 
and 42 U.S.C.); 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11 (establishing Office of the National 
Coordinator); 42 U.S.C. § 17912 (establishing grant program). 
 81. See Terry, supra note 14, at 46 and accompanying text. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-12(a) (2016). 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-32(c)(1) (2009). 
 84. Id. at §§ 258, 260; 45 C.F.R. § 164.308 (2019). 
 85. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.310(a)(2)(ii), (a)(2)(iii), and (d)(2)(i) (2019). 
 86. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 
13402, 123 Stat. 115, 261–62. Note that a breach is distinguishable from a 
vulnerability in that a vulnerability involves a possibly exploitable security 
fault in an application, whereas a breach is an actually-used vulnerability to 
affect some end, most often malicious, such as stealing data. See generally 
Sharon Durant, Types of Security Threats: The Differences Between a 
Vulnerability, Threat and Breach?, DIGITAL WEST (May 19, 2015), 
https://blog.digitalwest.com/blog/what-is-the-difference-between-a-security-
vulnerability-threat-and-breach. As such, breach notification would not 
necessarily come into play on discovery of a vulnerability that has not been 
used; nonetheless, breach notifications may be sent if a party thinks it to be 
reasonably prudent, especially if they have indication that there is some not 
insubstantial chance that a vulnerability may have been exploited. Cf. 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.404 (2019) (“A covered entity shall . . . notify each individual whose 
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Disclosures of PHI to carry out business operations are limited 
by the Act to the “minimum necessary” data.87 
The weight of HIPAA and HITECH’s regulatory text is 
promulgated through HIPAA Omnibus Regulations.88 The 
regulations provide for civil monetary penalties for breaches of 
the Act’s regulations,89 allowed business uses for protected 
health information,90 and rules relating to notification of 
breaches to the public.91 The section of regulations pertaining 
specifically to privacy and protection of electronic health 
information and records specifically calls for “[f]lexibility of 
approach,” enabling covered entities to use any “reasonabl[e] 
and appropriate” security measures as long as they “ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability” of all EHRs, protect 
against reasonable threats to that data’s security, and protect 
against banned uses or disclosures of EHRs.92 This flexibility 
comes with certain mandatory minimum standards designed to 
enforce some sense of security competence on covered entities, 
including a requirement for risk assessments, and 
                                                        
unsecured protected health information has been, or is reasonably believed by 
the covered entity to have been accessed . . . as a result of such a breach.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 87. § 13402, 123 Stat. at 265. 
 88. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.101 (2017) (describing the purpose of 45 C.F.R. 
§ 160 in part as implementing HIPAA and HITECH). This regulation only 
received its real enforcement and regulatory teeth from the 2009 HITECH Act 
amending HIPAA. See Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting 
Health Privacy in an Era of Big Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595, 608–10 (2014). This particular set of regulations is 
often called the Security Rule. Id. For more on the Security Rule, see Sharona 
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability and 
Electronic Health Record Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1556 (2009). 
 89. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2019) (establishing a per-violation window of 
$100 to $50,000, and an added penalty of not more than $1.5 million for 
repeated, identical violations in the same year). 
 90. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2019). This regulation allows for disclosure, 
e.g., to the individual, for purposes including treatment, operations, or 
payment, and in compliance with the rest of the regulation, among other uses. 
Id. 
 91. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.404 (2017) (requiring the notification to be in “plain 
language,” describe the event and the types of information breached, steps 
individuals should take to protect themselves, a description of what the entity 
is doing to remediate the breach and provide free-of-charge contact information 
for concerned customers). Section 164.406 requires notification of a large breach 
(more than 500 residents of a State or other jurisdiction) to be disseminated to 
the media and the Department of Health and Human Services within 60 days. 
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.406 (2019). 
 92. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (2019). 
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implementation of reasonable and appropriate safeguards 
pursuant to the broader Privacy Rule.93 
A proposed piece of legislation, the Improving Health 
Information Technology Act, was a tabled piece of bipartisan 
legislation in 2016 designed to address the shifting cybersecurity 
concerns in the healthcare market.94 The legislation introduced 
more concrete requirements on healthcare information 
technology, including a ban on information blocking in 
particular applications and a general requirement of unimpeded 
and open access to consumer health information.95 The bill 
provided for the creation of a partially-voluntary, standardized 
rating system for health IT products drawing from providers, IT 
professionals, patients, security and design experts, 
manufacturers, and others.96 These ratings would evaluate 
platform openness, security, usability, and conformity to 
standards.97 Products receiving a one-star rating from an 
independently-convened rating panel would be decertified, as 
would products not reporting appropriate information to the 
Department of Health and Human Services in a timely 
manner.98 Product ratings would be available for public review 
on the Department website.99 Decertification results in that 
provider being exempted from Medicare’s Meaningful Use 
Incentive program.100 
II. ANALYSIS 
This part discusses ways the present Acts, regulations, and 
court holdings emphasize the importance of the principle of 
healthcare record privacy through strong enforcement 
provisions. It will then turn to an examination of how those laws 
fail to provide for an adequate framework for disseminating, 
                                                        
 93. See Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 608. 
 94. See S. 2511, 114th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions, 2016). 
 95. Id. § 3(a). 
 96. Id. § 3009A. Also of note is the section directing the Secretary to draw 
from the expertise of NIST in developing these standards. See id. 
 97. See id. § 3009A(b)(4)(A) (listing categories of reporting criteria for 
health information technology products). 
 98. Id. § 3009A(g)–(i). 
 99. Id. § 3009A(k). 
 100. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S.2511 IMPROVING HEALTH INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY ACT (2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-
bill/2511. 
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enforcing, and unifying healthcare record security best practices 
as a component of personal and national security, exposing 
resource-strapped or careless providers and insurers to 
extensive potential liabilities. 
A. HIPAA AND ITS HITECH AMENDMENTS LAY IMPORTANT 
GROUNDWORK FOR DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY. 
HIPAA and its amendments provide an important line of 
protections for valuable health information.101 While the 
piecemeal, sectoral approach to information security and privacy 
results in an inconsistent patchwork of regulation across sectors, 
HIPAA and HITECH create a somewhat powerful enforcement 
regimen for the release of patient protected health information 
and personally identifiable information, and are largely 
successful at creating the statutory framework for a 
comprehensive, sector-specific information governance baseline 
regimen in the healthcare space.102 
HIPAA derives its main enforcement power from the 
promulgations of administrative procedures through the notice 
and comment rule processes.103 Its broad definition of health 
information and health care provider, health plan, and health 
care clearinghouse appropriately includes most segments of the 
healthcare services and delivery sector. This includes companies 
without a direct relationship to the patient on the processing or 
use end, like certain business associates and subcontractors.104 
                                                        
 101. See Shoaski & Segal, supra note 74; see also James Titcomb, Windows 




(establishing that time period as the first major period of consumerization of 
the internet with the advent of Windows 95 (with Internet Explorer) providing 
many people with their first taste of internet browsing). 
 102. See Bell, supra note 75; see also Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 88, 
at 1556; see also Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 607–09. Notably, 
however, HIPAA’s only enforcement mechanism comes from enforcement by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, lacking a private right of action, 
which has left the regulatory and statutory framework open for substantial 
criticism in its end efficacy from within the federal government itself and some 
sectors of the healthcare legal community. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 
88, at 1556–57. 
 103. See § 262, 110 Stat. at 2023–28; see Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 
88, at 1556–57. 
 104. See §§ 261–62, 110 Stat. at 2021–23 (describing health information as 
all data created or received by a covered entity and relating to the physical or 
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The uniform inclusion of public (e.g. veterans’, Medicare, 
and Medicaid) and private (group and individual) health plans—
the primary payer side of the American healthcare model—
covers much of the sensitive information health plans carry that 
is distinct from the information health care providers carry, 
namely financial information, health questionnaires, cross-
provider referrals and diagnostic codes, and the personal 
information of covered households.105 Their inclusion is not 
overbroad, as recent breaches have aptly demonstrated: health 
payers process protected health information that is as 
significant as the information processed by the providers in their 
network, and the risks of exposure of that information justify 
their inclusion in the legislation.106 
Moreover, the wide inclusion of health care 
clearinghouses—institutions that manage a component of the 
health care data processing business, like billing or coding 
vendors—serves to protect patient information from disclosure 
when working outside the somewhat-direct payer-provider 
relationship.107 Requiring data clearinghouses to abide by the 
regulations applied to their clients provides incentives for 
providers and payers to carefully select vendors to work with 
their sensitive client information, and ensures that all phases of 
the traditional health care business model are adequately 
seeking to protect patient data.108 
The current regulation, through HIPAA, of not only the 
health care records themselves, but the records relating to 
payment and provision of care, recognizes the risks that the 
present information model presents to patients.109 The risks of 
disclosure of health payer information ancillary to the leaking of 
patient health records, such as insurance member and group 
IDs, credit card numbers, and routing information, make the 
economic pain of an unauthorized release of health information 
much worse due to the extensive costs of healthcare benefit and 
                                                        
mental health of an individual or the provision or payment of their care); see 
also Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 608. 
 105. §§ 261–62, 110 Stat. at 2021–23; see supra notes 4, 6, 24 and 
accompanying text. 
 106. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text; see also infra note 111. 
 107. See § 262, 110 Stat. at 2021. 
 108. See Austin Rutherford, Byrne: Closing the Gap Between HIPAA and 
Patient Privacy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 212 (2016) (discussing the expansion 
of entities subject to HIPAA). 
 109. See § 262, 110 Stat. at 2022. 
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classical financial frauds.110 As financial crimes against 
healthcare companies are comparatively difficult to detect in 
cases where identity theft is the root cause, the Act’s broad 
inclusion of financial information under its ambit of protection 
is a response appropriately measured to the risks of financial 
data leakage, even in the modern computing era.111 
HIPAA’s stringent sanctions serve to provide an 
appropriately strong incentive for health care companies to focus 
on data security and the privacy of their patients outside of 
prior-existing causes of action. The regulations promulgated 
under the Act call for severe penalties for failure to comply with 
the privacy requirements of HIPAA, with up to $50,000 in 
penalties assigned per violation and $1.5 million assigned for 
repeat, identical violations during a calendar year.112 The 
massive potential for liability for failure to comply with federal 
privacy requirements imputed by the Act and its regulations in 
this case provide a reasonable penal incentive for companies to 
safeguard the privacy of their patients’ information.113 The 
flexibility in the regulation for penalty value assignment enables 
the Department of Health and Human Services to scale their 
assessment of fees to the severity of the breach while providing 
enough of a dollar figure amount to facially dissuade companies 
from playing loosely with protected information.114 
In a world shrinking by the proliferation of big data and the 
resulting ability to extrapolate based on a few bits of data, the 
combined breadth of regulation and potential severity of 
sanctions continue to reflect this changing reality.115 Though 
individual health records pose enough of a risk to an individual’s 
privacy and financial integrity in isolation, the amalgamation of 
data available to providers in the present technological 
environment, and, thus, stored en masse on health service 
                                                        
 110. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Phuong Tran, 
Anthem Data Breach Will Cost Record Fine of $115 Million, PAUBOX (June 26, 
2017), https://www.paubox.com/blog/anthem-data-breach-will-cost-115-million 
(providing information on liabilities extending out of a HIPAA violation). 
 112. 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2019). 
 113. See Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 622 (describing civil penalties 
as “important incentives for proper behavior”). 
 114. Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2017) (providing civil money penalties ranging 
from $100 to $50,000 per violation). 
 115. See, e.g., id.; §§ 261–262, 110 Stat. at 2021–23; see also Rutherford, 
supra note 108, at 212–13. 
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providers’ and payers’ databases, provides a far greater level of 
danger in the event of their release.116 The morass of data now 
stored as part of individual health records can easily decode 
individuals’ living situations, states and patterns of health, and 
financial information, among other data.117 
An act amending HIPAA, HITECH, discussed previously,118 
began attempts to modernize HIPAA for the digital age where 
necessary.119 One such needed modernization was in enacting 
breach notification provisions, which struck an appropriate 
balance on data protection while comporting with other sectors’ 
regulations, providing for uniform requirements to protect 
consumers.120 Requiring consumers to be notified of breaches, 
and perhaps substantial vulnerabilities where a vulnerability 
carries substantial risk of breach, within sixty days absent the 
presence of a finding from law enforcement officers that 
notification would impede a criminal investigation or damage 
national security, and to report breaches to the Department of 
Health and Human Services for disclosure acknowledges the 
aforementioned ballooning data (with the risks and liabilities 
contingent on that ballooning) of health providers and payers.121 
With the Act recognizing the digitization of data and consequent 
compounding of pieces of data into comprehensive, centralized 
masses of files, the legislation’s breach notification requirements 
enable consumers to be protected from the multiple types of 
fraud to which they are now more vulnerable.122 Mandating 
disclosure of such breaches requires transparency and 
accountability to customers, officials, and the public regarding 
the effectiveness of a company’s data security regimen and the 
potential for risk in doing business with that company.123 
                                                        
 116. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 119. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 88, at 1556–57. 
 120. See, e.g., § 13402, 123 Stat. at 261–62; see also Pasquale & Ragone, 
supra note 88, at 652 (“The post-HITECH landscape will increasingly balance 
these [privacy] concerns with the goals of innovation, access, and cost-control.”). 
 121. See discussion supra Section I.B; see also Rutherford, supra note 108, 
at 212–13. 
 122. See Rutherford, supra note 108, at 213 (noting that data breaches are 
increasingly common over the years). 
 123. See Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 645 (arguing that intense 
surveillance of the data security and privacy system motivates providers to 
modernize their practices and increases their productivity). 
2019] BLEEDING OUT 305 
 
Meanwhile, the breach notification requirements enable those 
protected consumers to, for instance, monitor their claims 
records and financial accounts.124 The Act’s public notice 
provisions also serve to cut the vectors for undetected medical 
benefit fraud by enabling payers to receive notice of a potential 
fraud problem arising out of a breach and implement 
countermeasures, saving all customers money through reducing 
losses from fraud on that plan.125 
B. THE PRESENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK DOES NOT PROPOSE 
CONCRETE SOLUTIONS TO THE MODERN APPLICATION SECURITY 
CONUNDRUM. 
Yet, with the strengths of HIPAA and HITECH noted, the 
present legal framework created by the Acts and their 
regulations exhaustively swings a punitive stick at the repairing 
damage end of the privacy enforcement spectrum.126 While, 
through threats of penalties for failures, HIPAA tries to 
incentivize adoption of best privacy practices, it relies too heavily 
on punitive enforcement methods and voluntary cooperation; it 
is all stick and no carrot.127 There is no provision for an adequate 
framework for actually improving privacy practices, especially 
in the technology realm, despite HITECH’s Part D 
amendments.128 
                                                        
 124. See id. at 644–45 (noting that educating customers to evaluate whether 
security is reasonable is critical). 
 125. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28 (providing examples of how to 
correct mistakes in one’s medical records when medical identity theft occurs); 
see also Hunter & Finkle, supra note 26 (reporting that fraud involving the 
Medicare program totaled more than $6 billion in the last two years). 
 126. See generally Rutherford, supra note 108, at 214 (arguing that the 
threat of no-cap damages in tort suits would improve compliance by various 
entities subject to HIPAA regulation). 
 127. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2017) (informing that HIPAA is enforced via 
civil monetary penalty); Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 645 (discussing 
the intense pressure the threat of enforcement action has on the industry, but 
also discussing, as one of the pitfalls, recalcitrance of cloud vendors due to the 
lower levels of enforcement action); Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 88, at 
1556–57. 
 128. See Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 608. See also 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.310 (requiring implementation of policies to prevent, contain, and correct 
security violations and perform regular control and risk assessments). The 
wording of these regulations leaves much of the control over such requirements, 
and with it a large chunk of discretion, with the companies themselves in an 
attempt at internalizing regulation while presumably reducing the regulatory 
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HIPAA’s use of penalties to incentivize a lack of breaches, 
while definitely a necessary component of the legislation, misses 
the mark on improving the practices of companies in the health 
care industry to prevent breaches from becoming an issue with 
such regularity in the first place.129 While certain groups of 
measures can be taken to reduce the scope or probability of data 
breaches occurring from a weakness in systems or protocols, 
securing the underlying systems and constantly assessing and 
improving on those roadblocks to theft will prevent the breaches 
from occurring, at least in that time frame, in the first place.130 
While the present Acts adequately address the post-breach 
remediation phase, there is little enforceable coverage of 
incentivizing pre-breach activities to prevent breaches from 
occurring or limiting their scope for when they do occur.131 
C. THE PROPOSED IMPROVING HEALTH INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY ACT OF THE 114TH CONGRESS BEGAN TO ADDRESS 
CONCERNS OVER INFORMATION GOVERNANCE BEST PRACTICES 
BUT FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR ENFORCEABILITY. 
The proposed, and ultimately tabled,132 Improving Health 
Information Technology Act of 2016 was the first legislative 
                                                        
and administrative burdens of providing for some more specific actions and 
processes required of these covered entities. 
 129. 110 Stat. 1936, 2021–23 (Aug. 21, 1996); 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2017). 
 130. See discussion supra section I.C.; see generally supra note 8 and 
accompanying descriptions of vulnerable cybersecurity practices. The OWASP 
guidelines there cited, for instance, outline the vulnerabilities as pathways to 
the breaches which cause the problems in the first place. Computers follow a 
linear logic, as does the process of pulling information off computers without 
authorization (i.e. the breach itself). For a breach to occur, there must be such 
a vulnerability. 
 131. While the Department does, in theory, have auditing authority, 
particularly through authority derived from dealings with CMS, the stretched 
resources of the Department have already been described as inadequate for 
purpose at best per the discussion and citation in Hoffman & Podgurski, supra 
note 88, at 1556–57. Regardless, audits remain a tool that, while more proactive 
than the remediation and penalty phase enforcement efforts described at length 
in this Note, still stems from reacting to a discovery of a problem as opposed to 
preventing those problems from occurring through adequate controls. While 
audits on those controls would be a good first step, the literature and 
discussions within these agencies make clear that this is not a process that can 
be improved with regulatory “sticks” and pervasiveness alone. Pasquale & 
Ragone, supra note 88, at 645–46. 
 132. That is to say, set aside for no further consideration in that session or, 
thus far, in any further session. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. 
No. 113-18, at 8 (1st Sess. 2013). Laying on the table has the meaning described 
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attempt at a partial solution to the conundrum discussed 
above.133 Most notably, the Act attempted to implement 
standards for IT product design in certifying products for use in 
Medicare’s Meaningful Use Incentive program.134 
The framework proposed by the Act focuses on the exchange 
of health information and voluntary data-sharing arrangements 
instead of mandatory standards for national health 
technologies.135 Coming out of committee, the Act requires the 
Department to merely “encourage” “voluntary certification of 
health information technology,” effectively gutting the proposed 
Act of any teeth it may have had or needed to ensure that its 
aims were met.136 In relegating the standardized, standards-
based star rating system for health IT, which would have drawn 
from a multisector, multidisciplinary panel of experts in 
assessing, among other qualities, a health IT software package’s 
information security and privacy protections, to a partially 
voluntary framework under which decertification from 
Meaningful Access would be the only real possible penalty and 
only under a fixed set of circumstances, the Act ends not far from 
where it began: with no real solution to the unregulated health 
IT development space and the problems it imports.137 
The framework further needlessly segments pediatric and 
adult data handling, adding an unnecessary layer of complexity 
to the Act.138 The Act provides, without explanation, for different 
certification standards and deadlines for various classes of 
patient and facility, most notably for practices supporting child 
health care.139 This complication is unnecessary: children have 
largely the same privacy and data exchange needs and medical 
record specifications as adults.140 Providing segmented 
                                                        
as it is a final disposition in the negative on certain substantive and subsidiary 
motions which affect consideration of a “main” question or matter before the 
Chair. 
 133. S. 2511, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 134. Id. § 2(a) at 53 ¶¶ 19–25. 
 135. See id. § 2(b). 
 136. Id. at § 2(b) at 56 ¶¶ 1–10. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. § 2(b) at 56 ¶¶ 17–25; see also id. § 2(b) at 57 ¶¶ 1–8. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Cf. Victoria Turk, GDPR Could Have Unintended Consequences for 
Teenagers, WIRED (May 23, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/gdpr-
children-under-16-parental-consent (emphasizing that GDPR recognizes that 
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requirements for various medicinal specialties does not advance 
what should be the ultimate aim of the legislation—to provide a 
simple but complete framework for securing national healthcare 
IT infrastructure.141 Segmenting products by specialty 
needlessly complicates the proposed regulatory processes in the 
Act and products which would be developed under its purview. 
III. SOLUTIONS 
A revised form of the proposed 2016 Act to empower the 
Secretary to promulgate regulations that secure the national 
healthcare technology infrastructure would move many 
providers toward compliance, imperfectly remediating many of 
the risks of data breaches at providers and payers. These 
solutions would balance incentivization with enforcement to 
create a program that promotes broad industry buy-in to its 
ambit. 
A. REFRAME THE 2016 ACT TO ENABLE EFFECTIVE 
ENFORCEMENT OF ACCEPTED BEST SECURITY PRACTICES FOR 
THE HANDLING OF SENSITIVE HEALTH INFORMATION 
One of the most glaring pitfalls of proposed amendments to 
healthcare privacy regulations is their focus on voluntary 
associations as the end of the Act’s provisions for ensuring 
compliance with best practices for data security in the 
industry.142 While any Act certainly should call for voluntary 
associations as part of its solutions to the healthcare IT 
conundrum in which the nation finds itself, any meaningful 
legislation and regulation would necessarily have mechanisms 
for enforcement contained inside their text.143 
Mandating that all healthcare IT appliances fall under the 
ambit of a universal, standardized healthcare IT assessment 
framework set by the Department of Health and Human 
Services regulators after consultation with all sides of the 
                                                        
children merit specific protection regarding their personal data because they 
may be less aware of the risks). 
 141. See S. 2511, 114th Cong. § 2(a) at 52 ¶¶ 22–25 (2016) (announcing that 
the goal of the Act is “the reduction of regulatory or administrative burdens 
relating to the use of electronic health records”). 
 142. See Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 645–46 (describing the 
recalcitrance of cloud healthcare actors to act on their own volition due to 
limited enforcement with no incentivizing framework separate from that). 
 143. See id. 
2019] BLEEDING OUT 309 
 
industry, like the framework proposed by the 2016 Act, would 
more effectively cover the healthcare IT subsector’s products and 
achieve the aims of ensuring healthcare IT security and 
preservation of privacy. As HIPAA exemplifies, broadly defining 
the reach of regulation in the healthcare information realm best 
protects consumers from poor practices relating to their data.144 
Placing all healthcare IT under the same assessment umbrella 
will enable uniformity of assessment, and thus expectations, of 
developed software, enabling a software-producing company to 
ingrain developmental best practices into all their healthcare 
products, ensuring that all products concerning protected 
patient health information are accurately and adequately 
evaluated.145 Maintaining a baseline of pre-set minimum 
threshold and target-level standards that are continuously 
reviewed, and then tracking compliance with their 
implementation, would affect the goals of the assessment 
framework. Ensuring this evaluation and publicizing the results 
as the 2016 Act proposed will increase patient confidence in the 
integrity of health technologies and work to protect patient 
privacy from the pre-breach, development and implementation 
stages, instead of retroactively attempting to put out the fire of 
a massive breach.146 
To prevent excessive barriers to entry, innovation, and 
competition in the healthcare technology space for Meaningful 
Use-covered entities, however, any such regulation should 
include reasonable provisions allowing for new entrants, 
products, and updates to be pushed to market without 
undergoing a full, exhaustive screening of their 
vulnerabilities.147 A process, for instance, of provisional 
accreditation for software that passes basic tests of security 
                                                        
 144. Id. 
 145. For instance, the framework like that found in OWASP, supra note 8, 
a) shows certain universal standards are applicable across sectors and 
approaches to development as a baseline for best practices, and b) provides an 
example of such a best practice regimen, combining enumerated concrete 
actions with abstract programming concepts to provide for a blend of 
programming flexibility (depending on the use case) and certain baseline 
requirements common to virtually every use case. See generally Pasquale & 
Ragone, supra note 88, at 625–26. 
 146. S. 2511; Rutherford, supra note 108, at 212–13; Pasquale & Ragone, 
supra note 88, at 620–23. 
 147. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 88, at 1565 (arguing that 
regulation that promotes standardization would not necessarily stifle 
competition). 
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pending a full assessment and rating, will enable new products 
to enter the market more efficiently while minimally 
compromising the security aims the proposed legislation would 
provide.148 
Moreover, enabling companies to update their EHR 
software without that iteration not being certified would 
encourage companies to improve on their software’s design, 
features, and security and privacy protections without the 
burdens of excessive bureaucratic review.149 A rolling process of 
continuous review and improvement would serve this end as 
well as ensuring continued compliance with evolving best 
practices in the security space.150 Providing for a regimen of 
regular review by HHS and re-rating by the evaluation panel of 
healthcare technology would balance these interests and 
incentivize companies to continuously improve software to 
prevent new security holes from plaguing older, deprecating 
software.151 Such a program would need to assess the realistic 
resource constraints and the burdens created on HHS and other 
involved entities, and the Secretary ought to promulgate 
regulations that would effectively balance burden with benefit. 
Providing for an actual enforcement mechanism for these 
rules, such as, at a minimum, decertification from Meaningful 
                                                        
 148. See id., at 1570 (discussing the early stages of development of EHR 
technologies as opportunities to formulate best practices, and, implicitly, build 
on those best practices as the EHR technology develops). Thus, it follows 
logically that providing for entry to new technologies would provide the impetus 
for new best practices, though with the risk of poor products coming to the 
market with lesser regulation, hence the provisional component of any 
emerging product accreditation scheme. A middle approach between effectively 
walling off the marketplace of EHR software to existing, verified entrants, and 
providing for a lack of regulation of these pieces of software, would balance the 
two competing interests of security and vitality. 
 149. See id. at 1565–66 (providing that the regulatory oversight contains a 
mechanism for timely approval of innovative user interface features that 
conflict with existing guidelines). 
 150. OWASP, supra note 8, at 19. Regular, but not so regular as to burden 
development, testing, and audit teams, code review, especially in light of new 
best practices and vulnerabilities, is accepted as a development industry best 
practice. See id. at 3. Similarly, reasonably frequent review of software, 
especially that published agilely (in short, continuously-updated iterations), 
will keep up standards while not burdening each incremental release of 
software with a full-fledged external review process, which could potentially 
keep out, as in the case with software security patch releases, the very sort of 
secure design that the process would, ideally, be intended to reach across the 
industry board. 
 151. See id. 
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Use in all cases involving EHR systems (not just on a voluntary 
basis) or imputing regulatory and civil liability for breaches to 
the software-producing and -using companies, would provide an 
adequate deterrence to ensure compliance with the proposed 
system.152 
B. CONFIRM IN THE ACT A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR 
BREACHES OF SENSITIVE HEALTHCARE DATA 
Enabling consumers to take control of their healthcare data 
by granting a federal right of action to those consumers against 
companies responsible for the negligent loss of, unauthorized 
access to, failure to mitigate a breach of, or lack of notification of 
a breach of their HIPAA-protected data would provide an 
additional and uniform deterrence to payers, providers, and 
software-makers to use properly secured healthcare software in 
their businesses, and to react appropriately to data breaches 
when they do occur.153 Since no such uniform private right of 
action exists under the current federal legal framework, 
confirming such a right under federal law would ensure 
uniformity of expectation and conformity to regulation.154 It will 
also protect patients from losses incurred by poor data security 
practices where they would have no other cause or right of 
action.155 
C. STRENGTHEN PROVISIONS FOR DATA SHARING OF BEST 
PRACTICES IN SECURITY BETWEEN VARIOUS PROVIDERS AND 
INSURERS 
Voluntary sharing of data relating to best practices in 
security and privacy of healthcare technology will strengthen 
the overall national healthcare security situation.156 The design 
                                                        
 152. See Terry, supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Rutherford, supra note 108, at 203 (arguing that giving the harmed 
individuals a right of action incentivizes better compliance with HIPAA by 
instilling in companies a fear of sizeable damage awards). 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See generally OWASP, supra note 8. These voluntary data sharing 
organizations would need to implement adequate internal safeguards for 
ensuring that any dangerous data being discussed has a minimal risk of leaking 
to outsiders who would thwart the whole security purpose of these data sharing 
associations and groups. However, making this process a national security 
clearance-level accreditation or screening may prove restrictive. Since these 
associations would be voluntary, it would likely fall to the voluntarily-
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of such a voluntary data sharing program would, ideally, involve 
the creation of an informal national panel of multiple subject-
matter experts in a variety of healthcare technology institutions, 
including providers, payers, and producers advising the 
Department of Health and Human Services and each other on 
technical and administrative procedures, development 
techniques, policies, and design principles to secure national 
healthcare technologies.157 Promoting this form of public-private 
and private-private partnership will foster communication 
between all involved parties, increasing an atmosphere of trust 
and collaboration already implicitly anticipated under the 2016 
Act’s proposed interoperability requirements.158 The 
information shared here would not create a standard of care or 
minimum expectation on healthcare technology providers and 
users, but would serve to strengthen the best practices in the 
industry, creating an environment where all participants’ 
products are able to progress in this area.159 
                                                        
associating organizations and the DHS to determine these standards reflexively 
based on their perceived risks, needs, costs, and opportunities. 
 157. There is precedent for national security-related information technology 
security voluntary data sharing, such as via the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations, groups with 
members voluntarily sharing information with one another. Information 
Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs), DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/isao (last visited Apr. 3, 2017). Indeed, this proposal is 
similar to those programs with much the same intent but designed to be formed 
specifically within the healthcare sector and among healthcare sector lines as 
would involve a broader group of stakeholders, and outside the more stringent 
national security clearance process as ISAOs are subjected to in determining 
members and information to be shared. This would reach in scope beyond only 
national security applications despite its implications for national security. 
 158. See id. 
 159. But see Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 88, at 645 (calling for a more 
mandatory approach, with best practices from any reasonable source absolutely 
mandated). The danger in a total approach is that it may stifle discussion of 
these best practices while constraining individualized development approaches. 
The idea is to create a strong minimum standard in the solution discussed 
relating to enforcement of best practices, discussed supra section III.A, but also 
to create a working group where practices can be shared such that there is a 
free exchange of ideas while recognizing the difference in situations between 
the various entities represented—that is, what works for one person at that 
particular table will not necessarily work for another given variation in use 
case, development, and architecture. The Secretary could then promulgate 
regulations enforcing the recommendations or outcomes of discussions of that 
panel. 
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D. CONFIRM THE SECURITY OF MEDICAL RECORDS AS A 
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURAL SECURITY PRIORITY 
Finally, a responsive legislative act would confirm that 
medical record security is a national security priority. Though 
the Department of Homeland Security confirms IT and 
healthcare as critical national infrastructure, its discussion 
documents fail to outline the nexus between IT and healthcare 
specifically, instead focusing on the system availability of 
patient care infrastructure and health IT.160 Considering the 
potential reach of medical records into the lives of everyday 
people and the harms visited upon customers in the event of 
their undue breach, the declaration of medical security as a 
component of national security is not a stretch of logic.161 At a 
minimum, ensuring patients’ financial security while protecting 
the medical payer systems from fraud constitutes a substantial 
enough economic risk and benefit calculation to consider 
healthcare technology as a component of important national 
infrastructure. Moreover, protecting the privacy of individuals 
and their medical encounters, as well as those of their families, 
prevents domestic and international opportunists from preying 
on Americans.162 
In the spirit of enshrining medical records as a matter of 
infrastructural security, an ideal Act would adopt at least short-
term grant provisions for ensuring the continued security of the 
nation’s medical infrastructure, particularly patient portals’ 
public-facing infrastructure as the most vulnerable link, 
addressing the concerns discussed over the “stick-only” approach 
currently taken to healthcare security.163 Creating a program for 
competitive and need-based grants to improve medical records 
                                                        
 160. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors (last visited Apr. 1, 2016); 
DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., HEALTHCARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR-
SPECIFIC PLAN 1–4 (2016). However, the DHS does recommend that healthcare 
IT be strengthened from a national security standpoint through 
implementation of improvements to private-sector information sharing, 
specifically through the ISAO, as this note also suggests. HEALTHCARE AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR-SPECIFIC PLAN, at 46; Exec. Order No. 13,691, 3 C.F.R. 
§ 13691 (2015). 
 161. See discussion supra section I.B. 
 162. See, e.g., Hunter & Finkle, supra note 26 (reporting that Chinese 
hackers allegedly had broken into one of the largest U.S. hospital operators’ 
computer network and stolen the personal information of 4.5 million patients). 
 163. See discussion supra section II.B.  
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software security would provide a positive incentive for product 
developers to create adequately secure products for use in the 
nation’s payer and provider systems.164 Ideally, this grant 
program would apply broadly, enabling grants to be used for 
secure systems development, secure systems implementation, 
and continuous operational security in live production 
environments, so as to address all major areas of vulnerability 
in the healthcare IT execution waterfall. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Recent, massive data breaches of patient portals in this 
country have revealed areas for improvement in the nation’s 
current piece-meal and overly focused healthcare technology 
regulatory framework. The relatively recent advent of patient 
portals as a commonplace technology, joined with the vast 
amounts of data stored on them and the permanently-evolving 
threat and risk environment surrounding digital information, 
particularly in the healthcare industry, reveals shortcomings in 
the dated provisions of HIPAA and HITECH. By adopting a 
public, transparent, rigorous, standards-based approach to 
assessing and approving healthcare software products for use, 
in addition to incentivizing proper developmental and pre-
breach practices instead of merely punishing poor security after 
a breach of health records, the country will be able to adopt 
scientific, uniform, and measurable healthcare IT standards and 
requirements to ensure the protection of its patient health and 
financial data with sufficient flexibility to meet the needs of the 
foreseeable future of healthcare technology. 
                                                        
 164. See discussion supra section III.A. 
